# NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Mapping

Aquaman maps to **NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5** control families that govern authentication, access enforcement, key management, and audit. Same evidence applies to **NIST CSF 2.0** (`PR.AA-*`, `DE.AE-*`) and **SOC 2 Common Criteria** (CC6.1 logical access, CC6.6 transmission, CC7.2 system monitoring).

| Control ID | Family | Aquaman feature | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| **IA-5** | Authenticator Management | Eight vault backend implementations (Keychain, 1Password, HashiCorp Vault, KeePassXC, encrypted-file, systemd-creds, Bitwarden, Keeper). Credentials are stored, rotated, and accessed via the vault's native APIs — aquaman never persists them itself. | [`test/compliance/nist/ia-5-authenticator-mgmt.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/ia-5-authenticator-mgmt.test.ts) |
| **AC-3** | Access Enforcement | Per-service request-policy engine evaluates method + path against allow/deny rules *before* credentials are injected. Denied requests return 403 and never reach the upstream provider. The UDS path is gated by `0o600` socket-file permissions; the opt-in loopback listener (Hermes path) is gated by a per-install token (constant-time compare) — requests without a valid token get 401 before any credential work, and `/_health` is the only exemption. | unit: [`ac-3-access-enforcement.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/ac-3-access-enforcement.test.ts) + integration via [`t0012-valid-accounts.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/atlas/t0012-valid-accounts.test.ts) (403 round-trip) + loopback token gate in [`loopback-listener.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/loopback-listener.test.ts) |
| **AC-6** | Least Privilege | The broker endpoint (v0.12.0+) materializes credentials per tool call with a short-lived TTL (default 60s, max 3600s). The agent's shell environment holds the credential only for the duration of one command, not for the agent process lifetime. The `aquaman-hermes` plugin observes least privilege from the other side: it consults only `*_BASE_URL` env vars, never `*_API_KEY` — it has no need for, and no access to, the credential. | covered by `AC-3` test + broker tests in `test/e2e/credential-proxy.test.ts` + [`hermes/tests/test_compliance.py`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/packages/hermes/tests/test_compliance.py) |
| **SC-12** | Cryptographic Key Establishment & Management | Vault backends are operator-chosen and operator-managed. Aquaman delegates key-management responsibilities to the chosen backend (Keychain, Vault, etc.) rather than rolling its own. | covered by `IA-5` test |
| **SC-28** | Protection of Information at Rest | Audit log is written `chmod 0o600` to `~/.aquaman/audit/current.jsonl`. Credentials at rest live in the vault backend (operator-chosen encryption). Aquaman's own writes (auth-profiles.json, config.yaml) use `0o600`. | [`test/compliance/nist/sc-28-protection-at-rest.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/sc-28-protection-at-rest.test.ts) |
| **AU-2** | Audit Events | Every credential access and policy decision produces an audit event with `RequestInfo` carrying id, service, method, path, statusCode, authenticated. Loopback (Hermes) requests flow through the same audited request path as UDS — the listener is not an audit bypass. | [`au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts) (same fixture covers AU-2/9/10) + loopback path in [`loopback-listener.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/loopback-listener.test.ts) |
| **AU-9** | Protection of Audit Information | Audit log is hash-chained (every entry contains the SHA-256 of the previous entry plus its own data). Tampering with any entry invalidates the chain from that point forward. Log is `chmod 0o600`. | [`test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts) |
| **AU-10** | Non-Repudiation | The hash chain provides non-repudiation: any mutation, insertion, or deletion of an entry breaks the chain and is detectable via `AuditLogger.verifyIntegrity()`. | [`test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts) |
| **SI-10** | Information Input Validation | Secret-pattern redactor scrubs known credential shapes (AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, OpenAI, Anthropic, JWTs, PEM private keys, …) from agent inputs/outputs. Service names + key names validated against safe regex before vault lookup. The Hermes `aquaman_status` tool/command validates its *output* discipline too — it surfaces only non-secret metadata (origin host:port + env var names), never the token or a key value. | [`si-10-input-validation.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/nist/si-10-input-validation.test.ts) + output discipline in [`hermes/tests/test_compliance.py`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/packages/hermes/tests/test_compliance.py) |

## SOC 2 Common Criteria mapping

| SOC 2 CC | NIST equivalent | Same evidence applies |
|---|---|---|
| **CC6.1** Logical access — restrict access to information assets | IA-5, AC-3, AC-6 | Yes |
| **CC6.6** Transmission of sensitive information | SC-12, SC-28 (in-transit covered by UDS + chmod 0o600 + operator-chosen TLS to upstream) | Yes |
| **CC7.2** Monitor system for unauthorized activity | AU-2, AU-9, AU-10 | Yes |

## What this is not

- Not an audit certification (SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / FedRAMP / etc.). Those require a third-party assessor.
- Not a complete control implementation — aquaman is a *component* that contributes evidence to those controls. The end-to-end control evaluation depends on how the operator deploys aquaman (vault backend choice, policy config, OS-level access to `~/.aquaman/`, etc.).
- The `aquaman-hermes` Python plugin contributes evidence only as a credential-free status/health layer. It enforces no control itself; the loopback isolation is proxy-side. Its conformance tests assert it does not *undermine* the proxy's guarantees (no credential held, harvested, or logged), not that it implements them.
- The daemon's credential cache (v0.13.1+) keeps vault-fetched values in proxy memory for a bounded TTL (default 15 min for 1Password/Bitwarden/Vault, else off; `cacheTtlSeconds: 0` disables). It is memory-only (SC-28 unaffected), sits behind policy enforcement (AC-3), emits audit events per request rather than per backend fetch (AU-2), and write-invalidates so vault rotation via aquaman is immediate (IA-5). Conformance: [`test/compliance/cache-residency.test.ts`](https://github.com/tech4242/aquaman/blob/main/test/compliance/cache-residency.test.ts).

## References

- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final
- NIST CSF 2.0: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
- SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria: https://www.aicpa-cima.com/resources/landing/system-and-organization-controls-soc-suite-of-services
- For a machine-readable evidence report, run `vitest run test/compliance/nist/ --reporter=json`.
