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Agentic AI Security Guidance

Aquaman aligns with multiple 2026 industry guidances on agentic AI security. These are documentary frameworks (no conformance programs), so claim alignment with specific recommendations, not certification.

CISA / NSA / Five-Eyes — “Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services” (April 2026)

Joint guidance from CISA + NSA + UK NCSC + Canada CCCS + Australia ACSC + New Zealand NCSC. Published 2026-04-30.

Source: https://media.defense.gov/2026/Apr/30/2003922823/-1/-1/0/CAREFUL%20ADOPTION%20OF%20AGENTIC%20AI%20SERVICES_FINAL.PDF

Recommendation theme Aquaman alignment
Incremental deployment Aquaman ships as a plugin / adapter that can be added to existing agent setups without re-architecting. aquaman doctor validates the integration before any credential flows.
Strong governance Hash-chained audit log records every credential access, every policy decision, every broker resolve. Tamper-evident chain provides governance-grade evidence trail.
Continuous monitoring Per-credential-access audit events with timestamp, service, method, path, outcome. aquaman audit tail for live monitoring.
Supply-chain controls Aquaman pins its own dependencies exactly (no semver ranges on aquaman-proxy from aquaman-plugin or aquaman-coder). Versions cross-pin between packages. ClawScan + VirusTotal third-party audit posture: Passed.
Expanded attack surface mitigation Process isolation: credentials live in a separate proxy process, not in the agent’s address space. UDS-only socket (chmod 0o600), no network exposure.
Privilege creep prevention Broker endpoint materializes credentials per tool call (default 60s TTL, max 3600s). Agent’s shell holds the credential only for the duration of one command. Project-scoped credential maps (v0.12.0+) limit which services each project sees.
Obscure event records (anti-tampering) Hash-chained audit log makes mutation, insertion, or deletion of entries detectable via AuditLogger.verifyIntegrity().

CSA MAESTRO — Multi-Agent Environment, Security, Threats, Risks & Outcomes

Cloud Security Alliance’s seven-layer threat-modeling framework for agentic AI systems.

Source: https://github.com/CloudSecurityAlliance/MAESTRO

CSA’s own MAESTRO commentary explicitly endorses the ephemeral credential broker model — credentials issued at execution time, scoped per task. That is a near-literal description of aquaman’s broker endpoint.

MAESTRO Layer Aquaman feature
L2 Data Operations Vault backends + secret-pattern redactor (incoming + outgoing data sanitization).
L3 Agent Framework HTTP interceptor strips Authorization and X-API-Key headers before routing — credentials don’t leak from agent SDKs that preset them.
L4 Deployment Infrastructure UDS-only socket, file-mode access control, no network exposure.
L5 Evaluation & Observability Hash-chained audit log; runnable conformance tests at test/compliance/.
L6 Security & Compliance This document set: MITRE ATLAS + NIST SP 800-53 mappings + this guidance alignment.
L7 Agent Ecosystem Per-agent adapters (OpenClaw shipping; Claude Code via aquaman-coder since v0.12.0, Codex since v0.16.0): the same vault, audit, and policy engine across every supported agent.

OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (canonical Dec 2025 list)

Source: https://genai.owasp.org/2025/12/09/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-the-benchmark-for-agentic-security-in-the-age-of-autonomous-ai/

Aquaman aligns with several ASI categories. The canonical “OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026” (published 2025-12-09) is the stable reference; in it ASI04 = Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities. We map to ASI02, ASI03, and ASI04 where the alignment is concrete.

ASI Category Aquaman alignment
ASI02 Tool Misuse HTTP interceptor scope is operator-controlled via services config (v0.11.4+). Channels not in services keep their direct-to-upstream behavior — no over-broad redirect.
ASI03 Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse autoGenerateAuthProfiles: false opt-out (v0.11.4+) for operators managing their own auth. Spawn env narrowed to an explicit allowlist (v0.11.5+) so the proxy process doesn’t inherit arbitrary parent secrets. Broker endpoint (v0.12.0+) for per-call materialization.
ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Aquaman cross-pins its own packages exactly (no semver ranges between aquaman-proxy / aquaman-plugin / aquaman-coder); ClawHub’s automated ClawScan and VirusTotal checks of the published plugin: passed (a registry scan, not a third-party audit; there has been none). Relevant to the 2026 npm-worm wave (Shai-Hulud / Miasma) that harvests AI-agent configs: credentials are never written into ~/.claude/settings.json or agent config (only the hook command is), so a config-stealing worm finds no secrets there. Gap: aquaman does not detect tampering of its own hook entries yet — aquaman doctor hook-drift detection is tracked for a future release (see ROADMAP.md).

NIST CAISI — AI Agent Standards Initiative

Announced February 2026 by NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation.

Source: https://www.nist.gov/caisi/ai-agent-standards-initiative

No published specification yet (as of 2026-06-16). The concrete deliverable in flight is COSAiS — “SP 800-53 Control Overlays for Securing AI Systems” (single-agent and multi-agent use cases), still in development. We track for when the overlay lands — at which point this doc gains another mapping section.

What this is not

  • Not a regulatory certification — these are advisory documents, not conformance programs.
  • Not exhaustive — there are many agentic-AI guidances; we map to the ones that cite-back to aquaman’s actual feature set.
  • Not transitive — aquaman doesn’t automatically make a downstream system “EU AI Act compliant” or “FedRAMP-ready.” It contributes evidence to those programs; the system-level evaluation remains the operator’s responsibility.

References